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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Whether Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-40 ("the savings statute") limits a

plaintiff to only one refiling after a failure of the action not on the merits.
2.

Whether an action properly refiled pursuant to the savings statute, which

includes a different party, relates back to the date of the original filing.
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is Hebertson v. Bank One Utah, 1999
UT App 342, 383 Utah Adv. Rep. 15.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a), which allows the Utah Supreme Court to review a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. The decision by the Court of Appeals, which this Court
has jurisdiction to review, was issued on December 2, 1999.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory provision in this case is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, the
savings statute. That statutory provision reads as follows:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal or failure.

431593v2
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Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40.
The rules setting forth the form and content of a petition for writ of certiorari are also
governing here. Those rules—Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46 and 49—are too
lengthy to set forth in their entirety here, and are therefore included in the appendix.
STATEMENT O F THE CASE
On December 31, 1988, Randi Hebertson accompanied her daughter on a visit to a
chiropractor at Willowcreek Plaza in Salt Lake County.

Willowcreek Plaza was a

professional office complex. As Ms. Hebertson walked on the sidewalk at Willowcreek
Plaza she fell on accumulated ice. She had immediate problems with her back and since that
time has had three back surgeries, all as a result of her fall.
Ms. Hebertson contacted the manager of Willowcreek Plaza within three days after
the accident and was referred to an adjustor at State Farm Insurance, the insurer for the
propeity, to arrange for the payment of her medical bills and for consideration of her claim
for injury. As months passed and it became evident that her injuries were quite severe and
would require surgery, she contacted an attorney. In the months and years following the
accident, information as to Ms. Hebertson's injuries was passed on to State Farm and it
investigated the claim.
Nearly four years after the accident Ms. Hebertson's condition had still not stabilized
to a point that allowed meaningful settlement negotiations between State Farm and Ms.
Hebertson. Ms. Hebertson's former attorneys filed a Complaint alleging negligence against
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Willowcreek Plaza on November 24, 1992. The four year statute of limitations ran
December 31, 1992.
That Complaint named "Willowcreek Plaza" as defendant. A copy of the Complaint
and Summons was served upon one of the managers of Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., which, at
the time the Complaint was filed, owned the office complex. (At the time of the accident,
the property had been owned by Valley Bank & Trust Company and Dime Savings Bank).
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. The court granted the motion, without prejudice, since
service of the Complaint upon the actual owners of the property did not occur within 120
days after the filing of the Complaint. The Order was entered on September 1, 1993.
Two weeks later, on September 17, 1993, Ms. Hebertson, through her former
attorneys, refiled a Complaint relying on the savings statute. Ms. Hebertson again named
Willowcreek Plaza as defendant. She timely served Valley Bank & Trust Company and
Dime Savings Bank since they were the actual owners of the property at the time of her fall.
Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that Dime Savings Bank and Valley Bank were
not doing business as Willowcreek Plaza and therefore could not be sued by that common
name. The trial court granted the motion on January 28, 1994.
Ms. Hebertson filed a Notice of Appeal on February 24, 1994. The Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed the Order of the trial court on May 11, 1995. Hebertson v. Willowcreek
Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Ms. Hebertson filed a Notice of Appeal to this
Court on June 16, 1995. This Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals on
September 20, 1996. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996).
433593v2
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Ms. Hebertson's former attorneys refiled the action underlying this appeal on May 23,
1997. The case, Civil No. 970903637P1, was assigned to Judge Hanson. The Complaint
named Valley Bank & Tmst and Dime Savings Bank as defendants. Judge Hanson granted
summary judgment to the defendants concluding that (a) the savings statute did not permit
more than one refiling, and (b) that, in any event, the addition of new parties to an action
refiled under the savings statute did not relate back to the original filing.
A Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed on May 7, 1998. On September 4, 1998,
this Court assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Following briefing, the Court
of Appeals heard argument in this case on May 17, 1999, and issued a decision and written
opinion in the case on December 2, 1999. In that decision, the Court of Appeals reversed
Judge Hanson's entry of summary judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the savings statute, by its
terms, permits more than one refiling, and that a refiling that adds new parties relates back
to the original filing so long as there exists an identity of interest between the original parties
and the new parties. The Court of Appeals held that the new defendants—Bank One
(formerly known as Valley Bank) and Dime Savings Bank—had a sufficient identity of
interest with the original named defendant—Willowcreek Plaza—and were sufficiently
alerted to the existence of the litigation.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that

Hebertson's 1997 complaint was timely and properly filed.
On January 3, 2000, Dime Savings Bank and Bank One (hereinafter "Petitioners")
filed a petition with this Court seeking a writ of certiorari.
433593v2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 31, 1988, defendants Bank One, Utah, N.A., fka Valley Bank

& Trust Company, and Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB, owned, operated or
supervised the operation of an office complex located in Salt Lake County, Utah, under a
variety of names, including Willowcreek Plaza, Willowcreek Shopping Village, Ltd., and
Willowcreek Plaza Executive Offices. (R.2)
2.

Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent Randi Hebertson was walking on a sidewalk

at the Willowcreek Plaza on December 31, 1988 when she tripped and fell on accumulated
ice. As a result of the fall, Ms. Hebertson suffered serious injury to her back. She has
undergone three major back surgeries in an attempt to repair the damage caused by the fall.
The attempts have failed. Her injuries are serious, permanent, and disabling. She now walks
with a cane whereas before the fall she engaged in a variety of recreational and other
physical activities integral to her role as wife, mother and provider for her family. (R. 2, 3233).
3.

Within three or four days after the fall, Ms. Hebertson contacted State Farm

Insurance Company, the insurer for the defendants' commercial property, regarding payment
for Ms. Hebertson's injuries. (R. 3, 32-33).
4.

The first complaint against Willowcreek Plaza was filed in November 1992,

shortly before the statute of limitations ran, in order to preserve the case while negotiations
with State Farm continued. (R. 3-5).
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5.

Ms. Hebertson suffered a series of procedural problems in going forward with

the merits of her case. To this day Ms. Hebertson has never had an opportunity to present
the merits of her case to a judge or jury. (R. 16, 33).
6.

This first complaint named "Willowcreek Plaza" as the sole named defendant;

Hebertson served the complaint on Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., the owner of the premises at
the time the complaint was filed. (R. 3, 15, 71).
7.

Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., was not the owner of the propeity at the time of the

accident. On December 31, 1988, the propeity in question was owned by Valley Bank and
Dime Savings Bank. (R. 72-73).
8.

Hebertsoif s original complaint was dismissed by the district court, without

prejudice, on September 22, 1993. (R. 3-4).
9.

Hebertson filed a second complaint on September 17, 1993, again naming

"Willowcreek Plaza" as the sole defendant in the caption of the complaint, but naming in the
body of the complaint Dime Savings Bank and Bank One (the successor to Valley Bank).
In addition, Hebertson served a copy of the complaint on Dime Savings Bank and Bank One.
(R. 4, 15, 56).
10.

On January 17, 1994, the district court dismissed the second complaint,

without prejudice. (R. 4).
11.

Hebertson elected to appeal the district court's dismissal of this second

complaint.

The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the dismissal, see Hebertson v.

Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and this Court affirmed the decision
433593v2
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of the Court of Appeals, see Hebeitson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996).
This Court's affirmance was dated September 20, 1996.
12.

Hebertson filed the complaint that forms the basis for this action on May 23,

1997. In this complaint, Hebertson named Bank One and Dime Savings Bank as defendants,
and served the complaint on them. (R. 1-7).
13.

Bank One and Dime Savings Bank asked the district court to dismiss the

complaint, on the ground that the Utah savings statute—Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40—allows
only one refiling, and that even if it did not, the new refiling could not name additional
parties not named in the original complaint. (R. 12-20).
14.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss on March 13, 1998, and

entered an order to that effect on April 8, 1998. (R. 83, 92).
15.

Hebertson filed her notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. (R. 83).

16.

On December 2, 1999, the Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing the

judgment of the district court, and remanding the case for trial.
17.

On January 3, 2000, Petitioners filed a petition with this Court, seeking a writ

of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In support of their petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioners Dime Savings Bank and
Bank One have simply submitted, nearly verbatim, the same brief they submitted to the Utah
Court of Appeals when that court heard argument on the merits of this case. In other words,
Petitioners have, in support of their petition for writ of certiorari, simply resubmitted their
433593v2
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meiits bnef, and have completely neglected to make any showing, as lequiied by Utah Rules
of Appellate Pioceduie 46 and 49, legarding any "special and important leasons" why this
Court should take this case This failuie on the part of the Petitioneis dooms then petition
on two separate grounds First, Rule 49(e) cleaily states that failuie to follow the piecise
lequuements of Rules 46 and 49 is sufficient reason to deny the petition Second, and moie
substantively, Petitioneis have utteily failed to cany then buiden of demonstiating to this
Court why this case is important and unique enough to justify expendituie of this Court's
scaice lesomces
ARGUMENT
PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE CRITERIA
SET FORTH IN RULE 46(A) IS MET HERE
The Utah Rules of Appellate Proceduie clearly state that "[rjeview by a writ of
certioian is not a mattei of light, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important leasons " Utah R App P 46(a)

Many state supieme courts,

including this Court, have followed the lead of the United States Supieme Court and have
instituted certioian pioceduies m oidei to caiefully husband then scaice lesources These
certioian pioceduies aie aimed at weeding out the oidinary cases, so that Supreme Court
lesomces aie spent only on cases of some importance Cf City of Oklahoma City v Turtle,
471 U S 808, 816, 85 L Ed 2d 791, 799 (1985) (stating that the "decision to grant certioian
lepiesents a commitment of scaice judicial lesomces with a view to deciding the meiits of
one oi moie of the questions piesented in the petition") The certioian pioceduies of this
433593v2
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Court are set forth in Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 45-51. Specifically, Rules 46 and
49 set forth the considerations governing this Court's decision whether to grant a writ of
certiorari in a particular case.
Rule 46(a) describes four types of cases that this Court may find particularly
important. First, this Court may grant a writ of certiorari "[w]hen a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law." Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(1). Second, this Court may
choose to examine a case in which "a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court."
Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(2). Third, this Court may elect to hear a case in which "a panel of the
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Utah R. App.
P. 46(a)(3). Finally, this Court may grant a writ of certiorari "[w]hen the Court of Appeals
has decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but
should be, settled by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(4).
Rule 49 requires that a petitioner seeking a writ of certiorari include in its petition "a
direct and concise argument explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule
46 for the issuance of the writ." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(9). This requirement is not
voluntary—the Rule requires that "[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain" the
direct and concise argument regarding the Rule 46 criteria. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)
413593v2
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(emphasis added); see also Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah
1983) (stating that the word "shall" is "usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted
as such previously in this and other jurisdictions"). Indeed, Rule 49 itself provides that a
petitioner who fails to comply with the dictates of the Rules may have its petition denied
solely on those grounds. Rule 49(e) states that "[t]he failure of a petitioner to present with
accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready and adequate understanding of
the points requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying the petition." Utah
R. App. P. 49(e).
Petitioners Dime Savings Bank and Bank One have utterly failed to comply with the
requirements of these rules. In their petition, Petitioners do not even mention Rules 46 or
49, and do not even bother to argue that any of the Rule 46 criteria are met here. Rather,
Petitioners have submitted, nearly verbatim, the exact same brief they submitted to the Utah
Court of Appeals when that court heard argument on the merits of the case.1 This procedure
violates the clear mandate of Rule 49, which clearly requires that Petitioners address the Rule
46 criteria in their petition. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(9). And Rule 49(e), by itself,
provides sufficient reason for this Court to deny Petitioners' petition.

*The changes Petitioners have made to their Court of Appeals merits brief, before
submitting essentially that same brief to this Court, deal chiefly with the removal of
certain rebuttal argument. This rebuttal argument was included in Petitioners' merits
brief below, because Petitioners were the Appellees there, and their merits brief was a
response to Hebertson's Appellant's Brief. Now, before this Court, Petitioners are the
first party to file a brief, and have therefore excised those portions of their merits brief
below which contained response argument. With this chief exception, the remainder of
Petitioners' petition is copied largely verbatim from their merits brief below.
433593v2
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More substantively, however, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate to this Court why
it should expend scarce judicial resources on hearing and deciding this particular case. This
Court presumably has only a finite amount of resources, and has therefore mandated that
parties seeking to invoke this Court's discretionary authority must affirmatively set forth the
reasons why time, energy, and money should be devoted to deciding this particular case. If
Petitioners cannot muster such an argument in their petition, despite the fact that such an
argument is mandated by clear rule, then this Court should not expend still further resources
in trying to ascertain whether this case is important enough to consider.
Because Petitioners have utterly failed to carry their burden of demonstrating why this
case is "special and important," see Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(9), this Court should deny
Petitioners' petition.2

2

Although Petitioners are allowed, by rule, to file a reply brief in support of their
petition if they so choose, Petitioners cannot resurrect arguments in that reply brief that
they did not raise at all in their petition. "[A]s a general rule, [this Court] will not
consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief" Von Hake v. Thomas, 759
P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 1988) (citing Romrell v. Zions First NatT Bank, 611 P.2d 392,
395 (Utah 1980)). This is the rule followed by federal appellate courts as well. See State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that issues
not raised in an appellant's opening brief are considered waived).
Indeed, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure confine a reply brief to "arguments
first raised in the brief in opposition." Utah R. App. P. 50(e); see also Utah R. App. P.
24(c). Because Petitioners have not argued that certiorari is warranted in this case under
any of the specific criteria set forth in Rule 46(a), Hebertson has no obligation to imagine
and rebut the arguments Petitioners might have made had they complied with the rules.
Therefore, the issue of the appropriateness of the Rule 46(a) factors has been raised in
neither the petition itself nor the brief in opposition. Under the cases cited above, and
under the plain language of Rule 50(e), Petitioners may not raise the issue of the
appropriateness of the Rule 46(a) factors in a reply brief Thus, any attempt by
Petitioners to make the argument, in a reply brief, required by Rules 46 and 49 should not
433593v2
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CONCLUSION
Petitioners' petition for writ of certiorari is deficient in several respects. Tellingly,
Petitioners have not even attempted to describe for this Court any of the reasons why it
should grant a writ of certiorari and hear this case. Rather, Petitioners have merely submitted
a near-verbatim copy of their merits brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioners have failed
to comply with the plain dictates of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and have failed
to carry their burden of demonstrating to this Court why it should spend resources on this
case.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Petitioners' petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted this / .

day of February, 2000.
JONES,
WALDO,
MCDONOUGH

HOLBROOK

\\c<y^—
By_
Timothy C. Houpt
Ryan M. Harris
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent

be countenanced by this Court.
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2

day of February, 2000,1 caused to be hand

delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR REVIEW OF
JUDGMENT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS to the following:
Richard K. Glauser
D. Joseph Cartwright
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

DEC 0 2 1999

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Randi Hebertson,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 980226-CA

Bank One, Utah, N.A., fka
Valley Bank & Trust Company;
et al.,

F I L E D
(December 2, 1999)

Defendants and Appellees.

j 1999 UT App 342 i

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
Attorneys:

Timothy C. Houpt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Daniel L. Steele and John Clyde Hansen, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Hi
Plaintiff Randi Hebertson appeals the trial court's award of
summary judgment in favor of defendants Bank One, Utah, formerly
known as Valley Bank & Trust Company (Bank One), and Dime Savings
Bank of New York, FSB (Dime Savings). Because we conclude that
the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), permits a
plaintiff to refile timely successive actions after each is
dismissed, so long as the dismissal is not on the merits and the
refiled action is substantially the same as the previous action,
we reverse.
BACKGROUND
1|2
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here
the appellant[]." Parker v. Dodaion, 971 P.2d 496, 496-97 (Utah
1998) .
%3
This appeal affords this court a second occasion to consider
Ms. Hebertson's attempt to recover for injuries sustained in
1988. On December 31 of that year, while accompanying her

daughter to an appointment at Willowcreek Plaza, a professional
office complex in Salt Lake County, Hebertson slipped and fell on
some ice, sustaining an injury to her back that required multiple
surgeries. Within the next three days, Hebertson contacted the
building manager, who referred her to the building's insurance
carrier, State Farm Insurance. Having been unable to reach a
settlement of her claim with the insurer, Hebertson filed a
complaint against "Willowcreek Plaza11 approximately one month
before the statute of limitations was to expire and served
process upon a manager employed by Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. As it
turned out, however, although Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. owned the
office complex when the complaint was filed, at the time of the
accident it was owned by Bank One and Dime Savings, which had
acquired it by foreclosure.1
1|4
On the motion of Willowcreek Plaza, L . C , the trial court
dismissed this first action without prejudice. Relying on the
savings statute in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), Hebertson
filed a second complaint, again naming "Willowcreek Plaza" in the
caption as the defendant, but naming in the body of the complaint
and serving Bank One and Dime Savings. See Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996). Bank One and
Dime Savings contended they could not be sued under the name
Willowcreek Plaza and moved to dismiss. The trial court granted
the motion. See id. Although Hebertson objected to dismissal of
this action, she did not move to amend the complaint to conform
the parties named in the caption to those described in the
complaintfs body. Rather, she insisted that Bank One and Dime
Savings were doing business under the name Willowcreek Plaza and
thus could be sued under that name. See id. See generally Utah
R. Civ. P. 17(d). In Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d
839, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this court rejected that
contention and upheld the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed our decision.2 See Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923
P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996).
1|5
Within a year of the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
second complaint's dismissal, and again relying on the savings
statute, Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, naming Bank One
1. At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for defendants
confirmed that defendants and Willowcreek, L.C. had the same
insurer and attorney.
2. After dismissal of the second complaint, Hebertson again
relied on the savings statute and filed a third complaint, naming
Bank One and Dime Savings in the caption as defendants. However,
electing to appeal the second complaint's dismissal, Hebertson
never served and, ultimately, voluntarily dismissed the third
complaint.
980226-CA
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and Dime Savings as defendants in both the caption and body. On
June 16, 1997, Bank One and Dime Savings were served with a
summons and a copy of this fourth complaint. Bank One' and Dime
Savings moved to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b) (6), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the savings statute did
not apply beyond a single refiling and the action was therefore
barred by the statute of limitations. Hebertson opposed the
motion, arguing that the savings statute allows multiple
refilings. Because it considered matters outside the pleadings,
the trial court correctly treated the motion as one for summary
judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56(c); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche,
Ross & Co. , 926 P.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Utah 1996), and granted
'summary judgment in favor of Bank One and Dime Savings. The
trial court ruled that the savings statute allows only a single
refiling and that even if multiple refilings were allowed,
Hebertson could not include new defendants in the refiled action.
Hebertson again appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
%G
"fSummary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.f Because the question of whether
summary judgment is appropriate is a question of law, we accord
no deference to the trial court." Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d
496, 497 (Utah 1998) (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)).
MULTIPLE REFILINGS UNDER THE SAVINGS STATUTE
^1
This case squarely presents us for the first time with the
issue of whether the savings statute permits a plaintiff to file
more than one new action after a dismissal not on the merits.3
To resolve this issue we must construe Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-4 0
(1996).
%8
"In matters of statutory construction, f [t]he best evidence
of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting
[an] Act is the plain language of the Act. 1 " Platts v. Parents
3. Although in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State
University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court
intimated that section 78-12-40 may not permit successive
refilings, see id. at 1221 n.10, we concluded the issue was not
ripe for adjudication and expressly stated "it would not be
proper for this court to render a definitive opinion on the
permissibility of refiling an action under Utah Code Ann. § 7812-40 more than once." Id. at 1220-21.
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Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (quoting Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)).
See also Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. ,
964 P. 2d 335, 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) («" [W] here the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, [the court] will not look
beyond it to divine legislative intent.'") (quoting Utah Sign,
Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633-34 (Utah 1995)).
Moreover, we "assume that 'each term in the statute was used
advisedly.1" Id. (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax
Common, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)).
1)9

The Utah savings statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives, may
commence a new action within one year after
the reversal or failure.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). By beginning with the word
"if," the statute suggests a set of conditions will follow.4 It
then recites conditions, the occurrence of which invokes the
application of the statutory consequences. The conditions are:
(1) "any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed;" or (2) "the plaintiff
fails in such action [--i.e., any action commenced within due
time--]or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits;"
and (3) the applicable limitations period has expired. Id. See
also Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (holding savings statute did not apply where
action was dismissed within original limitations period).
^10 Because the first two conditi ons were drafted in the
disjunctive, Hebertson need only satisfy one of them and the
Third condition for the statute to apply. The third condition
was clearly satisfied here because the limitations period had
long since expired. See Hebertson, 923 P.2d at 1390. Because
there was no reversal of a judgment for Hebertson, and thus the
4. For example, Webster's defines "if" as synonymous with "in
the event that: in case" and "so long as: on condition that."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1124 (1976). Cf.
Black's Law Dictionary 746 (6th ed. 1990) ("In deeds and wills,
this word, as a rule, implies a condition precedent[.]").
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first condition does not apply, if Hebertson satisfies the second
alternative condition--!.e., that "the plaintiff fails in [any
action commenced within due time] otherwise than upon the
merits"--the savings statute applies. Here, because the trial
court dismissed the second complaint without prejudice, the
action did not fail on the merits. The question remains whether
it was filed "within due time." If it was, the action commenced
with plaintifffs fourth complaint was timely because it was filed
within one year of the Utah Supreme Court's affirmance of the
dismissal of plaintiff's second complaint. If the second action
was not filed "within due time" for purposes of the savings
statute, plaintiff had no right to file the fourth complaint.
Ull Our Supreme Court has already held that, for purposes of the
savings statute, an action is "commenced" when the new complaint
is filed. See Muir v. W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., 851 P.2d 645,
647 (Utah 1993). Further, the term "within" denotes "on the
inside or on the inner side" and "inside the bounds of a place or
region," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2627
(1976), while "due" refers to that which is "[j]ust; proper;
regular; lawful; sufficient." Black's Law Dictionary 499 (6th
ed. 1990). Hence, an "action commenced within due time" refers
to an action filed inside the period of time authorized by lav;.
Hl2 Defendants would have us equate "action commenced within due
time" narrowly, i.e., as being an action commenced within the
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. This view
overlooks that the savings statute itself establishes a time
frame within which to file an action, indeed, an action that
would be untimely under the statute of limitations. Accordingly,
we believe that Hebertson's second action was "commenced within
due time" when she filed it within the year authorized by the
savings statute.
Hl3 The plain language of section 78-12-40 is simply no bar to
serial recourse to the savings statute. Therefore, Hebertson's
fourth action was timely because it was brought within one year
of the failure, not on the merits, of her second action, which
had been filed "within due time" under the savings statute.
Simply stated, if the Legislature meant to limit the savings
statute to a single use per cause of action, it would have
avoided general phraseology like "within due time" and stated its
intention clearly, a simple thing to do. See, e.g., Ga. Code
Ann. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1998) (providing that "this privilege of
renewal shall be exercised only once"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1105 (Supp. 1998) (authorizing refiling only for those actions

980226-CA

5

that failed other than on the merits and were "commenced within
the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation").5
Hl4 Consistent with the dicta in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v.
Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), see
supra note 3, Bank One and Dime Savings argue that the statute's
use of singular articles--i.e., "may commence a new action within
one year after the reversal or failure"--contemplates only one
refiling.6 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) (emphasis added).
5. We acknowledge that some courts in other states have reached
the opposite conclusion when reviewing their own savings
statutes. Nonetheless, because these decisions interpret
statutes with language distinct from that in our savings statute,
these interpretations are unpersuasive. See, e.g.. Estate of
Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 581 A.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Conn. 1990)
(holding that the multiple refilings expressly authorized by
Connecticut's savings statute must all be made within one year of
the failure of the first action, described by the statute as the
"original action"); Worley v. Pierce, 440 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that by stating the "privilege of renewal
shall be exercised only once," the savings statute permitted only
one refiling); Foster v. Pettiiohn, 213 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo.
1948) (holding that its statute allowing refiling "from time to
time, within one year" permitted multiple refilings, but not
beyond the one-year savings period). We also recognize that
other jurisdictions have determined that their statutes, which
are more similar to Utah's, do not permit multiple refilings.
See, e.g., Sylvester v. Steinberg, 505 N.E.2d 28, 29 (111- App.
Ct. 1987) (holding that the statute did not permit multiple
refilings although it "d[id] not contain express limitations on
the number of voluntary dismissals and refilings available");
Denton v. City of Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute
did not permit successive refilings after the initial one-year
savings period); Hull v. Rich, 854 P.2d 903, 904 (Okla. 1993)
(statute permitted only one refiling). Nevertheless, we find
these decisions ultimately unpersuasive, largely because they
turn more on policy considerations than plain meaning. In Utah,
courts are not so quick to veer from a statute's plain meaning
and undertake a foray into the realm of policy. See, e.g., Olsen
v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998)
("'Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language
need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant
policy considerations.'") (quoting World Peace Movement of Am. v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994)).
6. Defendants do not address the rule of statutory construction
in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (Supp. 1999), which provides
that "[t]he singular number includes the plural, and the plural
(continued...)
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We believe such an inference is neutralized by the statute's
prior reference to "any action . . . commenced within due time."
Id. (emphasis added). See Websterfs Third New International
Dictionary 97 (1976) (defining "any" as "one indifferently out of
more than two[,] one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind"
and stating it is "used as a function word especially] in
interrogative and conditional expressions to indicate one that is
not a particular or definite individual of the given category").
Although other courts have construed similar language to permit a
plaintiff to file only one new action, see United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Swyden, 53 P.2d 284, 285-88 (Okla. 1935) (holding
that "commence a new action" did not authorize multiple
refilings), such a result is not universal. See Sharp Bros.
Contracting Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 817 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo. Ct.
App.) (noting that "'a new action' [does not] mean only one new
action") (emphasis added), cert, denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 662
(Colo. 1991).
^15 We reject defendants' contention that our decision will make
the course of lawsuits uncertain or open the floodgates on the
stream of litigation. Plaintiffs have little natural interest in
filing multiple unproductive actions or paying multiple filing
fees. Moreover, the savings statute is limited to actions that
are not resolved on the merits and to circumstances where an
action was originally brought within the limitations period.
Further, multiple refilings in cases such as these are rarely
needed because generally plaintiffs will be given the opportunity
to simply amend their complaints to remedy these kinds of
deficiencies. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), 21; Sulzen v. Williams,
977 P.2d 497, 501-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (concluding trial court
abused its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint so
that caption would name correct parties, which were described in
body). Moreover, if any action is filed "for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation," the party and/or
counsel may be sanctioned. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (1) .
Hl6 Because the Supreme Court's affirmance of the dismissal of
Hebertson's second complaint occurred less than one year before
Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, that complaint was timely
under the savings statute. The terms of the savings statute do
not include a "once per customer" limitation. Accordingly, the
trial court erred in concluding that Hebertson's fourth complaint
was barred by the statute of limitations.

6. (...continued)
the singular."
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ADDITION OF "NEW" PARTIES
1|l7 We now turn to Bank One and Dime Savings's argument that
even if we permit successive refilings under the savings statute,
Bank One and Dime Savings could not be added as new parties in
the fourth action. Their general position in this regard has
merit. Unlike statutes of limitation that provide a general time
period in which a plaintiff may file any action arising out of a
given occurrence, the savings statute affords a means only to
renew the earlier action. Consequently, the "saving statute does
not apply when the new action is brought against a different
defendant than was the first one, or by a different plaintiff."
"51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 820-21 (1970) .
See Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1983) (holding that to
invoke the savings statute, the party bringing the subsequent
saved action must have been a "party to the original lawsuit who
had affirmatively sought relief therein"). Thus, the refiled
action is "new" only in the sense that it results from the filing
of a different complaint. See Black's Law Dictionary 1042 (6th
ed. 1990) (explaining that "new" "ordinarily . . . is a purely
relative term and is employed in contrasting the date, origin, or
character of one thing with the corresponding attributes of
another thing of the same kind or class") .7
7. Equally important as relying on the statute's plain language
is the rule "that a statute should be construed as a whole, with
all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other
and with the overall legislative objective of the statute."
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).
See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) ("The statutes . . . and all
proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.");
State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (" [A] ny
interpretation of statutory language that would nullify other
statutory provisions is improper."); Ferro v. Utah Dep't of
Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting
interpretation that would "rewrite the Act and impermissibly
render [another section] a complete nullity"). Without the
requirement that the claims be substantially the same, a lazy
plaintiff could easily avoid the diligence that statutes of
limitation are meant to promote by filing an action at the
eleventh hour against anybody; then filing a notice of dismissal
before service or obtaining a dismissal for failure to prosecute,
using the extra time to figure out who to sue; and then filing a
new complaint a year later. Such a result would eviscerate our
statutes of limitation and undermine their purpose of
"requir[ing] that claims be advanced while the evidence to rebut
them is still fresh" and would burden courts and parties with
"'stale' claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago
(continued...)
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Ul8 However, the prevailing view is that the prior and refiled
actions need only be substantially the same. Thus, "a change of
parties does not preclude an application of the statute where the
change is merely nominal or the interest represented in the
renewed action [is] identical with that in the original action."
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 821 (1970) . This
is consistent with the approach taken in a closely related
context. When a pleading is amended after expiration of the
limitations period, such amendment will relate back to the
original filing if it "merely restates in a different form the
cause of action originally pleaded." Id. § 234, at 787. See
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996).
Because the basic inquiry is the same for determining whether a
"change" in defendants is within the scope of the savings statute
as it is for determining if such a change relates back under Rule
15(c), we adopt the same test.8 That is, just as with the
relation back of an amendment, a refiled action is substantially
the same as the original and is thus authorized by the savings
statute where the new and old "[p]arties have an identity of
interest [such that] 'the real parties in interest were
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them
unofficially, from an early stage.1" Sulzen v. Williams, 977
P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Doxev-Layton Co. v.
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)). See also Wilcox, 911 P.2d
at 369-70 ("'[A]n amendment which substitutes or adds new parties
. . . relat[es] back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'")
(quoting Doxey-Layton Co., 548 P.2d at 906).
1J19 We conclude, as a matter of law, that Bank One and Dime
Savings had a sufficient identity of interest with Willowcreek
Plaza and were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings resulting
from the second complaint. Thus, the action commenced with the
fourth complaint is substantially the same as that commenced with
the second complaint and, therefore, is within the scope of
section 78-12-40. In Sulzen, we held that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying amendment to the complaint's caption to
substitute parties where the proper parties were named in the
body of the complaint and served with process. See Sulzen, 977
P.2d at 501 ("'"Tf the body of the complaint correctly identifies
the party . . . courts generally will allow an amendment under
7 . (...continued)
that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured."
2d Limitation of Actions § 17, at 602-03 (1970).

51 Am. Jur.

8. Significantly, both sides have applied Rule 15(c) analysis in
their briefs, thus implicitly recognizing that this approach is
appropriate.
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Rule 15 to correct technical defects in the caption. " ! ff) (quoting
Wilcox, 911 P.2d at 370) (other citation omitted; omission in
original). This case is remarkably similar. That is/
notwithstanding the second complaint's caption, Bank One and Dime
Savings were described as defendants in the body of the complaint
and were actually served. This is sufficient notice to bring the
fourth complaint within the savings statute as a matter of law.9
CONCLUSION
^20 We hold that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants Bank One and Dime Savings. By
its plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) allows a
plaintiff to refile a new action each time a prior action fails
other than on the merits, provided the new action is filed within
one year of such failure. However, because the renewed action
must be substantially the same as that in the prior action, new
parties may be added only if, because of sufficient identity of
interest, the addition is not prejudicial. In this case, Bank
One and Dime Savings had such an identity of interest with
Willowcreek Plaza and no prejudice is apparent. Therefore
section 78-12-40 applies to Hebertson's fourth complaint
notwithstanding the change in the caption. Accordingly, we
reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial or
such other proceedings as may now be appropriate.

Gregory &: Orme, Judge

H21

WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge

9. Additional facts indicate Bank One and Dime Savings had
actual notice and reinforce this conclusion. For example, Bank
One and Dime Savings's insurance carrier had notice of
Hebertson's claim and injuries only a few days after the incident
and long before Hebertson filed any action.
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Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment deleted circuit courts from the list of
courts in Subdivision (c)(2).
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Compiler's Notes. — The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 42 also applies to this rule,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v Anderson, 910 R2d 1229
(Utah 1996), State v Gordon, 913 P.2d 350
(Utah 1996), State ex rel Utah State Dep't of

Social Servs. v Sucec, 924 P.2d 882 (Utah
1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L Rev 150.

Rule 44. Transfer of improperly p u r s u e d appeals.
If a notice of appeal or a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but
is pursued in an appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the
appellate court, either on its own motion [or] on motion of any party, shall
transfer the case, including the record on appeal, all motions and other orders,
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in the
case. The clerk of the transferring court shall give notice to all parties and to
the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring the case. The time for filing
all papers in a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time
schedule of the receiving court.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4C is
renumbered as Rule 44. It is amended to permit
the transfer of an appeal that is timely but
improperly filed not only between the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals but also to the
District Court. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the District Court has jurisdiction
to review informal adjudicative proceedings of
administrative agencies. The Supreme Court

and Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the
review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Provided that all parties have notice of the intent
to seek judicial review, the same policy considerations that permit the transfer of an improperly filed appeal between the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals should permit the
transfer of such a case to the District Court,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Garcia, 805 P.2d

199 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Padilla v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991).

TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, a n d decrees of
court of appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions'') of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of coi tiorari.
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
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with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of
law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by
the Supreme Court.
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the
opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry recommending that
the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a
recommendation by motion or otherwise.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97
(Utah 1992).

Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint
and separate petitions; cross-petitions; parties.
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested jointly,
severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition Separately; or any two or more
of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it will
suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. A
cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other filing.
(b) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the
parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of such
notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party noted
as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with service
on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition.
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intending to
file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time prior to
action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an order to
have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court certify the
record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to the Supreme Court.
Motions to certify the record prior to action on the petition by the Supreme
Court should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to the Supreme
Court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in opposition and such
understanding cannot be derived from the contents of the petition or the brief
in opposition, including the appendix. If a motion is appropriate, it shall be
made to the Supreme Court after the filing of a petition but prior to action by
the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case of a stay of execution of a
judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion may be made before the filing
of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the Supreme Court or any party to the
ca$e may request that additional parts of the record be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
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Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(a) Timeliness ofpetition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the final
decision by the Court of Appeals. The docket fee shall be paid at the time of
filing the petition.
(b) Refusal ofpetition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a writ
of certiorari which is beyond the time indicated in paragraph (a) of this rule or
which is not accompanied by the docket fee.
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of Appeals,
not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If a petition for rehearing
is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari
for all parties runs from the date of the denial of rehearing or of the entry of a
subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing.
(d) Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed:
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule; or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this
rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of
another party to the case is granted.
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the cross-petition. The
clerk shall refuse any cross-petition not accompanied by the docket fee.
(4) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other
filing. The clerk of the court shall refuse any filing so joined.
(e) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a crosspetition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule,
whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise
requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the same as provided
in Rule 26.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Procedural default
—Cause
Procedural default
Cause
Petitioner seeking federal habeas review sufficiently alleged "cause" for his procedural default under this rule when he claimed that, due

to his incarceration in Nevada, he had no
reasonable access to, or notice of, Utah appellate rules and, thus, he should be afforded the
opportunity to prove that these circumstances
did in fact exist for purposes of excusing the
default Dulin v Cook, 957 R2d 758 (10th Cir.
1992)

Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari*
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order
indicated:
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Supreme
Court contains the names of all parties.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities cited,
with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited.
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of the
questions should be short and concise and should not>be argumentative or
repetitious. General .conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The statement of a
question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly
included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court.
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions issued by
the Court of Appeals.
(6) .A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is invoked, showing:
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and the date of
the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of time within which
to petition for certiorari;
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari is
filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of certiorari in connection
with whiqh the cross-petition is filed; and
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court.
(7) Controlling .provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and regulations set forth verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the controlling
provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice and their
pertinent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph
(10) of this paragraph.
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in the
lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall b§ supported by citations to the record before and to the opinion of
the Court of Appeals.
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argument
explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 46 for the
issuance of the writ.
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order:
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, and
all orders, including any order oja rehearing, delivered by the Court of Appeals
in rendering the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders,
judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in companion cases by
the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by administrative agencies and
that are relevant to the questions presented. Each document shall include the
caption showing the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number
of the case, and the date of its entry; and
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are relevant
to the questions presented but were not entered in the case that is the subject
of the petition.
If the material that is required by subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this
paragraph is voluminous, they may be separately presented.
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27.
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in
subparagraph (a)(9) of this rule. The'petitioner shall not file a separate brief in
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support of a petition for a writ of certiorari. If the petition is granted, the
petitioner will be notified of the date on which the brief in support of the merits
of the case is due.
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as
possible, but may. not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table of
authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph (a)(7) of this
rule, and the appendix.
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity The failure of a petitioner to
present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready and
adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a
sufficient reason for denying the petition.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae,
(a) Brief in opposition Within 30 days after service of a petition the
respondent shall file an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why
the case should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Such brief shall comply
with Rules 26(b), 27 and, as applicable, 49.
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 49(a)(7), and the
appendix
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief
in opposition
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, the
petition and the brief in opposition, if any, will be distributed by the clerk for
consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed,
distribution of both it and the petition for a writ certiorari will be delayed until
the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the expiration of the
time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file.
(e) Reply brief A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the brief
m opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under paragraph
(d) of this rule will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief. Such
brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such brief
shall comply with Rules 26(b) and 27
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the Supreme Cotut'
granted on motion, or at the request of the Supreme Court. A motion for leave
shall identify the interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why d!
brief of an amicus curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent^
an amicus curiae shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose1
position it will support, unless the Supreme Court for cause shown shall grant1
leave for later filing, in which event it shall specify within what period aflJ
opposing party may answer. Such brief shall comply with Rules 26(b), 27, and,
as applicable, 49. The brief may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject1
index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule1
49(a)(7), and the appendix.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992,)

Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Order after consideration After consideration of the documents distruw
uted pursuant to Rule 50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying tb«
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petition or granting the petition in whole or in part. The order shall be decided
summarily, shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a decision
on the merits. The clerk shall not issue a formal writ unless directed by the
Supreme Court.
(b) Grant of petition.
(1) Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered,
the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals and counsel of record.
(2) If the record has not previously been filed, the Clerk of the Supreme
Court shall request the clerk of the court with custody of the record to certify
it and transmit it to the Supreme Court.
(3) The clerk shall file the record and give notice to the parties of the date on
which it was filed and the date on which petitioner's brief is due.
(4) Rules 24 through 31 shall govern briefs, argument, and disposition of the
petition for writ of certiorari. In applying Rules 24 through 31, the petitioner
shall stand in the place of the appellant and the respondent in the place of the
appellee.
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied,
an order to that effect will be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court
forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of record.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

